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Abstract
We used the foreign-exchange rate forecasts of the Consensus Economics Inc. poll to analyze 
whether exchange-rate forecasters herd or anti-herd. Forecasters herd (anti-herd) if their forecasts 
are biased towards (away from) the consensus. Upon implementing a robust empirical test 
developed by Bernhardt, Campello, Kutsoati (2006), we found that forecasters anti-herd.
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1. Introduction 
Exchange rate expectations play a prominent role in monetary models of exchange rate 
determination. Since the seminal work of Allen and Taylor (1990) and Ito (1990), survey data of FX-
-market participants are used to shed light on the question of how exchange rate expectations are 
built. One important stylized fact of the literature is that – in contrast to the prevailing assumption 
of the rational representative agent – real world forecasters are heterogeneous in a number of 
aspects. This finding has also gained attention in other strands of the literature: For instance, 
Elliot, Komunjer, Timmermann (2008) recently examine heterogeneity in output projections while 
Mankiw, Reis, Wolfers  (2003) and Capistran and Timmermann (2009) investigate expectation 
heterogeneity with respect to inflation forecasts. MacDonald and Marsh (1996), Elliot and Ito 
(1999), Bénassy-Quéré, Larribeau, MacDonald (2003) as well as Dreger and Stadtmann (2008) all 
find evidence in favour of foreign exchange forecasters’ heterogeneity (see Reitz, Slopek 2009 for oil 
prices). Investigating the determinants of forecast dispersion, Menkhoff, Rebitzky, Schroder (2009) 
find strong support for the chartist and fundamentalist approach pioneered by Frankel and Froot 
(1990). The authors show that recent exchange rate changes as well as the degree of misalignment 
explain the dispersion of forecasts.1
•  Based on the findings of forecaster heterogeneity, several authors try to answer the question 
about the sources of heterogeneity: 
•    One  factor  that  might  influence  foreign  exchange  rate  forecasts  is  the  central  bank 
intervention behaviour (Beine, Bénassy-Quéré, MacDonald 2007; Reitz, Stadtmann, Taylor 2010).
•  Batchelor and Dua (1990) regard the heterogeneity of forecasts as the outcome of active 
product differentiation among the group of forecasters.
Based on a theoretical model of Scharfstein and Stein (1990), several empirical papers (for 
example, Lamont 2002; Mitchel, Pearce 2007) link the heterogeneity of forecasts to the age of the 
forecaster. One line of argumentation goes into the direction that younger forecasters have an 
incentive to herd since they are uncertain about their forecasting skills and try to hide behind 
the mass. Contrary to this line of argumentation, other researchers argue that especially young 
forecasters do not have too much to lose and, therefore, differentiate their forecasts from the crowd. 
Instead, older and more experienced forecasters with a higher salary and reputation have a larger 
incentive to herd, because they do not want to risk the reputation earned in the past.
Another source of heterogeneity could stem from a strategic behaviour of forecasters if they 
actively differentiate their forecasts from each other. Using the foreign-exchange rate forecasts 
of the Consensus Economics Inc. poll for the zloty/dollar and yen/dollar exchange rate, we 
analyzed whether forecasters herd or anti-herd. Herding arises if forecasts are biased towards 
the consensus forecast. Researchers often have conjectured that herding of market participants 
may help to explain large swings in exchange rates. This raises the question whether exchange-
rate forecasts reflect herding of forecasters. Our results suggest that they do not. We report, in 
fact, strong evidence of anti-herding of forecasters. Anti-herding implies that forecasts are biased 
1    From a policy marker’s perspective it is important to understand that market heterogeneity seems to be a major source 
of exchange rate volatility (Evans 2002), constituting an additional channel by which central bank intervention 
may calm disorderly markets (Dominguez, Frankel 1993). In addition, the relationship between exchange rate 
misalignment and forecast heterogeneity is also important for the so-called coordination channel of intervention 
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away from the consensus forecast. We analyzed forecasters’ (anti-)herding by means of a new 
empirical test developed by Bernhardt, Campello, Kutsoati (2006), which is robust to various 
sources of misspecification. Our evidence of anti-herding of exchange-rate forecasters is in line 
with mounting evidence of anti-herding of security analysts in their earning forecasts (Bernhardt, 
Campello, Kutsoati 2006; Naujoks et al. 2009). The underlying methodology was also used by 
Mensah and Yang (2008) to examine whether the Regulation Fair Disclosure act had an impact on 
the degree of anti-herding among security forecasters. Pierdzioch, Rulke, Stadtmann (2010) find 
also an anti-herding behaviour among oil price forecasters.
We lay out the empirical test in Section 2. We describe the data set and our results in Section 3. 
We summarize our key results in Section 4 and also provide an explanation for our findings.
2. The test
 
How can we test whether forecasters herd or anti-herd? As a starting point, we assume that each 
forecaster uses all available data, the best econometric models, and own experience to forecast the 
exchange rate as accurately as possible. On this basis, the forecaster derives a private (unpublished) 
forecast. Furthermore, the forecaster can also gain some information from the forecast of other 
forecasters. Hence, each forecaster can compute an average of all forecasts in the forecasting arena 
– the so called consensus.
  Each forecaster can use the consensus to adjust the private forecast. If the private forecast is 
larger than the consensus, the forecaster could adjust the private forecast in a way that brings the 
individual forecast closer to the consensus (herding) or further away from the consensus (anti- 
-herding) – compared to the private forecast.
Figure 1 can be used to structure the setting: The forecaster uses all information to come up 
with a private unpublished forecast  )
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. This private 
forecast should be – on average – equal to the subsequently realized exchange rate. In other words:
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(1)
  
The error term (u)  should have an average value of zero and should not show any serial 
correlation over time. If this condition is not met, there would be some space for an improvement of 
the private forecast and, hence, the private forecast would not be the best forecast. The probability 
of an over-shooting of the exchange rate and the probability of an undershooting should be equal 
to 0.5. 
In Figure 1 it was assumed that the private forecast is larger than the consensus. If the 
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. If one combines the two lines of arguments it follows that – on 
average – the published forecast will be lower than the realized exchange rate: 
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Hence, we get for the conditional probability: G. Stadtmann, D. Schäfer 10
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If forecasters herd, the probability that the forecast is larger than the realized exchange rate 
– conditioned on the fact that the individual forecast is larger than the consensus – should be 
smaller than 0.5. In contrast to this, the conditional probability should be larger than 0.5 in case 
that forecasters anti-herd and equal to 0.5 if forecasters neither herd nor anti-herd.
The elements sketched above build the ground for an empirical test for herding or anti- 
-herding behaviour developed by Bernhardt, Campello and Kutsoati (2006). The null hypothesis 
is that forecasters, given an information set, form unbiased forecasts of the future exchange rate 
(no herding or anti-herding). The probability, P, that an unbiased forecast issued by forecaster i in 
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, overshoots (undershoots) the future exchange rate,
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, should be 0.5, regardless of the consensus (that is, average) forecast,
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. Accordingly, the 
conditional probability of overshooting in case a forecast exceeds the consensus forecast should be 
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and the conditional probability of undershooting in case a forecast is less than the consensus 
forecast should be
            
)
~
( 1 , + t i f
) 1 ( + t
1 1 1
~
+ + + + = t t t u s f
1 ,
~
+ t i f
1 , + t i f
1 + t f
1 1 , 1 ,
~
+ + + > > t t i t i f f f
1 1 , + + < t t i s f
2
1
) | ( 1 1 , 1 1 , < > < + + + + t t i t t i f f s f P
1 , + t i f
1 + t s
1 + t f
2
1




> < + + + + + + t i t t t i t i t f s f f f s P
2
1 ) , | ( 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 , 1 < > + + + + + + t i t t t i t i t f s f f f s P














x x if x x
x x if n
P x x
x x





            (5)
 
Forecasts may be biased towards the consensus forecast (herding) if forecasters believe that   
ex-post poor forecasts do not damage their reputation in case other forecasters have made the same 
forecast error. Forecasts may be biased away from the consensus forecast (anti-herding) if, for 
Figure 1
Consequences of herding behaviour
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  Published forecast of forecaster i 
)
~
( 1 , + t i f
) 1 ( + t
1 1 1
~
+ + + + = t t t u s f
1 ,
~
+ t i f
1 , + t i f
1 + t f
1 1 , 1 ,
~
+ + + > > t t i t i f f f
1 1 , + + < t t i s f
2
1
) | ( 1 1 , 1 1 , < > < + + + + t t i t t i f f s f P
1 , + t i f
1 + t s
1 + t f
2
1




> < + + + + + + t i t t t i t i t f s f f f s P
2
1 ) , | ( 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 , 1 < > + + + + + + t i t t t i t i t f s f f f s P














x x if x x
x x if n
P x x
x x
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example, a forecaster tries to signal superior forecasting skills by deliberately deviating from the 
consensus forecast.
If a forecaster herds, the forecast will be closer to the consensus forecast than in the case of an 
unbiased forecast. The conditional probabilities should be smaller than 0.5. Anti-herding implies 
that the forecast will be farther away from the consensus forecast than in the case of an unbiased 
forecast. The conditional probabilities should be larger than 0.5. The test statistic, S, developed 
by Bernhardt, Campello, Kutsoati (2006) is defined as the average of the estimates of the two 
conditional probabilities. Unbiased forecasts imply S = 0.5, while herding (anti-herding) implies 
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Bernhardt,  Campello,  Kutsoati (2006) show that it is the averaging of the conditional 
probabilities that makes the statistic robust to problems arising due to, for example, correlated 
forecast errors and market-wide shocks under the null hypothesis. For example, a large 
swing in the exchange rate may give rise to a sequence of positive unforeseen market-wide 
shocks. Such shocks raise (lower) the probability that the exchange rate exceeds (falls short 
of) forecasts, given any conditioning information, but leave the average of the conditional 
probabilities unaffected under the null hypothesis. Market-wide shocks, thus, do not bias the 
mean of the S statistic. They reduce its variance because of the resulting cross-correlation of 
forecast errors and, thereby, make the test statistic S conservative (it becomes more difficult 
to reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness). Similarly, the averaging of the conditional 
probabilities implies that the test statistic is not biased if forecasters forecast the mean rather 
than the median in case of an asymmetric distribution over the exchange rate. Finally, because 
the test statistic is based on estimates of conditional probabilities (that is, relative frequencies 
of events), disruptive events like sudden reversals of exchange-rate trends have a minor effect 
on the test statistic.
3. Empirical analysis
Our data on exchange rate forecasts are taken from the Consensus Economics Inc. poll. We studied 
the one-month ahead forecasts of the zloty/dollar and the yen/dollar exchange rate. Figures 2 and 
3 give an overview of the exchange rate development as well as the key characteristics of the   
FX-forecasts. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. For the zloty/dollar exchange rate, forecasts 
are available from January 1996 to May 2009, where 26 different forecasters participated on average 
10.2 times (min. 1/max. 23) in the survey. We have access to 24 different surveys over time. The 
average participation rate was 11 forecasters (min. 9/ max. 14). Hence, the underlying data set is an 
unbalanced panel. The information in the lower panel refers to the case of the yen/dollar exchange 
rate forecasts. The main difference between the two currencies can be seen in the fact that the 
survey frequency is higher and the number of institutions that participate in the survey is higher 
as well for the yen compared to the zloty.
An interesting feature of the Consensus Economics Inc. data set is that we can observe 
individual exchange rate expectations of a large number of forecasters. Another interesting feature 
is that the poll has been conducted for many years. We therefore could analyze both the cross- 
-sectional and the time-series dimension of the data.G. Stadtmann, D. Schäfer 12
Table 2 summarizes the results: For the zloty/dollar exchange rate, the conditional probability 
of overshooting in case forecasts exceed the consensus forecast is 68.9% and the corresponding 
conditional probability of undershooting in case forecasts fall short of the consensus forecast 
is 66.9%, implying that the test statistic takes the value S = 0.6777. The lower (upper) bound of   
Figure 2
Zloty/dollar exchange rate and forecasts
Note: The line with the rectangles denotes the exchange rate, st. The solid line denotes the average of exchange rate 
expectations in period t for the exchange rate in period t + 1,  f
_
t + 1. The shaded area indicates the range of individual 
exchange rate forecasts. 
2.0 








Yen/dollar exchange rate and forecast
Note: The line with the rectangles denotes the exchange rate, st. The solid line denotes the average of exchange rate 
expectations in period t for the exchange rate in period t + 1,  f
_
t + 1. The shaded area indicates the range of individual 
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a 95% confidence band is 0.6174 (0.7381), implying that anti-herding of forecasters of the zloty/
dollar exchange rate is significant. The results are pretty robust when the yen/dollar exchange rate 
forecasts are taken into consideration. The S-statistic takes a value of  S = 0.6889. Since the number 
of observations is higher for the yen/dollar exchange rate forecasts the corresponding confidence 
interval is much smaller compared to the zloty/dollar ratio. 
In order to analyze the robustness of our results across extended periods of depreciations and 
appreciations, Figures 4 and 5 summarize rolling sample estimates of the test statistic S (left axis). 
For the zloty/dollar exchange rate forecasts, every rolling estimation window comprises six different 
surveys, which implies a rolling estimation window of about three years.2 For the yen/dollar 
exchange rate, each rolling window reflects exactly the surveys of a three-year horizon. While there 
are fluctuations of the S statistic across rolling estimation windows, we always observe 
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2   Since the surveys for the zloty/dollar exchange rate forecasts are irregularly spaced in time, the time span of each 
rolling window changes slightly over time.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics











Average forecast 3.61 zloty/USD 2.31/4.75











Average forecast 114.11 yen/USD 80/160
Note: The following institutions participated in the zloty/dollar poll: ABN AMRO, Bank Austria, Bank of America, 
Barclays Capital, Calyon, Chase Manhattan Bank, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Agricole, Creditanstalt, CS First 
Boston, Deutsche Bank Research, Erste Bank, General Motors, Global Insight, HSBC MIDLAND, JP Morgan, Merrill 
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Oxford Econ Forecasting, Raiffeisen Zentralbank, Standard Chartered, UBS Economic 
Research, Unicredit MIB, Vienna Institute –  WIIW, Wood & Company.
The following institutions participated in the yen/dollar poll: ABN Amro, Allianz, Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo, 
Bankers Trust Company, Banque Nationale de Paris, Barclays Bank, Barclays Capital, Barclays de Zoete Wedd, BNP 
Paribas, Chase Manhattan, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, 
General Motors, Global Insight, HSBC, Imperial Chemical Inds, Industrial Bank of Japan, ING Barings, JP Morgan, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, NatWest Group, Nomura Research Institute, Oxford Econ Forecasting, Royal Bank of 
Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale, Standard Chartered Bank, UBS Warburg, Westdeutsche Landes 
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Rolling estimation window: zloty/dollar exchange rate forecasts
Note: The solid line represents the test statistic, S. The dotted lines represent the boundaries of a 95% confidence band. 
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4. Conclusions and interpretation of the results
We have presented strong evidence of anti-herding of exchange-rate forecasts. As other researchers 
(Bernhardt, Campello, Kutsoati 2006; Mensah, Yang 2008; Naujoks et al. 2009; Pierdzioch, Rulke, 
Stadtmann 2010) also have reported evidence of anti-herding, it becomes an important issue for 
future research to analyze why forecasters anti-herd and, in particular, which of the available 
competing theoretical explanations of anti-herding is applicable in the case of exchange-rate 
forecasts.
So why should forecasters have an incentive to anti-herd? One line of argumentation could 
depart into the direction of product differentiation (Batchelor, Dua 1990). Forecasters differentiate 
their forecasts to differentiate themselves from other forecasters in the industry. The motivation 
behind this behaviour can best be described by a quote of Lamont (2002, p. 268): “If forecasters are 
paid according to relative ability, they might scatter, since it is hard to win when making a forecast 
similar to others.”
A different line of argumentation could depart in the direction of the work of Laster, Bennett, 
Geoum (1999) who argue that the forecasters’ customer base consists of two groups. One group of 
customers use the forecasts on a regular basis and buy the forecasts regularly. They are interested 
in a very accurate forecast and choose the forecaster who has provided the most accurate forecast 
over a longer time period. Irregular customers are only in need of a forecast once in a while. As 
a consequence, they do not use the forecast accuracy over a long period of time as their decision 
criterion but pick that forecaster who has provided the best forecast in the recent period. 
Figure 5
Rolling estimation window: yen/dollar exchange rate forecasts
Note: The solid line represents the test statistic, S. The dotted lines represent the boundaries of a 95% confidence band. 
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In a more formal way Laster, Bennett, Geoum (1999) use the following profit function to 
describe the market: 
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α                           (6)
where the variable Π symbolizes the profit from forecasting, α the weight for the proportion of 
regular, and (1 – α) the proportion of irregular customers. 
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 represents the absolute difference 
between the forecast (x) from the realized value (x0) and hence the accuracy of the forecast. Any 
difference between these values will create a loss. Furthermore, it is assumed that the irregular 
customers create an amount of P that is divided up by those forecasters (n) who provide a correct 
forecast. If the forecast turns out to be incorrect, the forecaster does not receive revenues from this 
customer base.
Due to the fact that the profit function is influenced by these two components, forecasters 
have an incentive to depart from the most likely and hence most accurate forecast: the higher 
the proportion of irregular customers in the market (1 – α) and the higher the revenues stream 
from irregular customers (P), the higher the incentive to depart from the consensus. This is the 
case because the forecaster has an incentive to provide a forecast which is not chosen by other 
forecasters. Of course, one would have a lower probability to get a part of the sum P but in the case 
of winning, the number of forecasters who have also made the same forecast (n) would be low. As 
a consequence, the expected profit from departing from the consensus is higher. 
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